This article explores the development of the Council for the Preservation of Rural England's (CPRE) policy response to the increasing demands for rural land by the armed forces and other war-effort related Government departments prior to and during the Second World War.
Introduction
First World War propaganda, aimed at motivating men to fight overseas and women to support the war effort at home, had positioned the rural landscape as the essential England being fought for. 3 This merging of nationalistic and topographical meanings of the word 'country' 4 encouraged the general public to identify with this post-enclosure rural landscape as something that was part of their own identity, even if the reality was that they might only rarely visit it and for practical or financial reasons could not hope or wish to live in it. This propaganda was to create a hostage to fortune in the inter-war period, as new or re-energised voluntary organisations, opinion formers and the media came to recognise that the State and private sector seemed to have none of the special regard for the country's landscape in the post-First World War period that the public had been implored to cultivate.
John Sheail identifies 'Reconstruction, Restoration and Recovery' as the key words of the first part of the inter-war period, 5 and the CPRE as a product of it, 6 representing a decision by a professional, educated segment of the inter-war generation to protect the country's 'heritage of natural beauty' 7 from 'alien forms of development' 8 such as new industrial sites which served centres of urbanisation not rural communities, and house-building which fed the desire of the moneyed classes to escape the worst aspects of urban life. David Matless observes that whilst concern for the landscape was not a new phenomenon, with the Commons Preservation Society formed in 1865 and the National Trust in 1895, 9 the inter-war landscape planning and preservation movement sought to ally 'preservation and progress'; 10 CPRE was one of these organisations; it was founded in 1926 as more of a federation of interest groups than a mass movement, in order to achieve a complete coverage of issues pertaining to the rural landscape through the coordination of efforts of groups concerned with architecture, planning, landowning , leisure, local government and wildlife.
With the coming of war, mere preservation must have seemed like a rather attractive concept however. At this time there was little legislative protection for land in rural (or indeed urban)
areas, even allowing for 1932's Town and Country Planning Act, and departmental responsibility for the environment at government level rested nominally within the Ministry of Health. British War Departments' pre-1939 demands were therefore unregulated and uncontrolled at a formal legislative and policy level, and this was exacerbated by the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act of 1940 which effectively empowered government and its ministries to undertake any action they deemed necessary in pursuit of war aims and objectives. With its preference for flat, well-drained sites ideal for airfields corresponding with the characteristics of good agricultural land, between 1934 and 1938 the annual loss of agricultural land in England and Wales to the Air Ministry rose from 3,000 to 24,500 acres; 21 the Ministry would go on to serve 62,000 land requisition notices during the course of the war. 22 Between 1939 and 1945, landholdings of the services as a whole increased from 140,000 to 903,000 acres, 23 including land for 450 new airfields, 24 and by 1944, 20% (11 million acres) of the UK's land area was under some form of military control. 25 The military's use of some of this land was admittedly short-term, with some requisitioned land being returned to its original use before the end of the war, particularly if it had an agricultural use, but some land was retained for decades due to military needs associated with the Cold War, and some land has never been returned to civilian use, emblematic of which remains the village of Tyneham, Dorset.
The work of CPRE in challenging war-related land requisitioning between 1936 and 1946 represents the only centrally coordinated activity at a national level by any voluntary body seeking to restrict and otherwise influence the use to which land in rural areas was utilised for war-related purposes. Whilst the National Trust did undertake valuable work in this area, sometimes in collaboration with CPRE, the Trust's primary duties were limited by its founding Act of Parliament to conserving the land and buildings that it had purchased or been covenanted; only CPRE had a national reach therefore. In the case of agriculture, the 41 the above suggests that the necessarily realistic and balanced appraisal of any given potential demand on rural land was already firmly in place before the war started.
Towards Stakeholder Status
CPRE wrote to the Ministry of Health in February 1937 in support of these policy objectives, and for much of that year awaited a formal, detailed response. Whilst it waited, the demands of the Government's Defence Departments continued unabated: over the course of the year CPRE was involved in twenty major cases of which three, it stated, were dropped due to "parliamentary criticism" and some others did not go ahead for other reasons or in an amended form as a result of interventions either by CPRE or the National Trust.
Events in
Wiltshire during that year would, however, act as a catalyst for the breakthrough that CPRE was seeking to achieve. The agriculturally-rich county was a hot-spot of Defence Departments were bound ultimately to receive priority, that it was not possible to avoid all of the issues which concerned CPRE, and that in the interests of national defence he was against an 'over-elaboration of consultative machinery', 46 he advised that he had nevertheless instructed the Defence and other departments concerned to consider the contents of CPRE's letter, and required each Defence Department to establish a procedure:
which will ensure that other interests of national importance shall receive adequate consideration when the selection and development of sites are being carried out and that that consideration shall take place in time to enable due weight to be given to the results by the Departments concerned, before decisions as to acquisition are taken. 47 The undertaking was both public and political. The Times quoted and commented on the letter at length in a news piece, 48 and in a simultaneously welcoming and sceptical Editorial, called the measure 'timely' given the 30,000 acres of agricultural land acquired for defence purposes over the previous three years, but felt that 'it remains to be seen how far the new arrangement results in a diminution of the protests which have so often appeared legitimate in the past.' 49 The 
Chamberlain: an Open Door
On the face of it Chamberlain's concession to CPRE represents a quite exceptional decision, for two reasons. Firstly, whilst Chamberlain invested considerably more hope in efforts for peace than some of his fellow politicians, he was nevertheless presiding over a government that was slowly and steadily preparing for war, and the consultative mechanism placed a responsibility on government departments which those who were less conservation-minded would doubtlessly have been happy to do without. Secondly, the consideration which Chamberlain gave to the issue must be seen in the wider context of his responsibilities at this point in his premiership, where he had so many demands on his time with international efforts to avoid war and domestic political turbulence: issues which have been much pored over by political and military historians. According to R. Whilst CPRE was clear and unequivocal in its support for the war-effort, it was careful not to
give this unconditionally at the expense of the very rural landscape it was pledged to protect.
When CPRE published its war-time position and priorities in July 1940; it was appropriately patriotic but also combative:
the threats to rural England that have arisen owing to the national crisis and the war have of course been greatly intensified. It is inevitable that while the very existence of the nation is at stake, all else must take second place. Nevertheless it is the considered opinion of the CPRE that the importance of safeguarding the English countryside has been increased rather than diminished in time of war. 64 This contrasted starkly with, for example, the more quixotic free-thinkers of the loosely formed organic movement, who would be singularly unsuccessful in securing any influence during the war, at least in part because, as Philip Cornford writes, 'organicism' was entangled with a range of 'eccentric and unstable, disreputable and hated ideas', 65 which in the context of the period, ranged from guild socialism 66 -to pacifism -to neo-Nazism.
The Chamberlain Mechanism in Practice
Although Chamberlain's response had not given CPRE the formal inter-departmental consultative machinery that it had wanted, it had given the organisation a mechanism through which it could engage with Government departments before decisions relating to war-effort related land requisition were taken. was dead by the end of that year. As CPRE was keen to state during the war, whenever these mechanisms were not always initially adhered to, 'the undertaking was precise and has never been revoked'. Council and as such could amend any primary or secondary legislation within the limits set by the Emergency Powers Acts; CPRE observed that 'it will be seen that it confers absolute control over all persons and all property'. 71 This proved no exaggeration; in the year after the compulsory acquisition through ownership of land, there was compulsory requisition over the course of the war of 14.5 million acres. 73 The consultation mechanism initiated by Chamberlain was therefore an operational requirement, but not something that Government
Departments were legally obliged to follow, particularly as conduct of all aspects of the war effort moved from Chamberlain's administration to Churchill's. Mandler does not provide any documentary proof of his assertion, but even if it was accurate at some point, CPRE's political influence and contacts by the mid-to-late 30s and into wartime, even putting the Chamberlain mechanism to one side, represented an impressive transformation.
Other Avenues of Influence

CPRE War-time Policy
In addition to the afore-mentioned set of operational principles that CPRE had developed The Council intends to concentrate its activities so far as agricultural development is concerned to the safeguarding of all potentially productive land by the permanent restriction or prohibition of building on such land except in cases where building is urgently required in the national interests…the invasion of agricultural areas by industrial undertakings of a sporadic and speculative nature will be resisted. 83 There were sporadic incidents during the war that only served to justify CPRE's position. In 1941 for example, in a case toxically mixing military imperative with business acumen, CPRE and other bodies opposed a development in the Lake District proposed by Butlin's, which would have involved the company building a camp for the Admiralty and then taking it over for use as a holiday camp at the end of the war. 84 Utilising its "Chamberlain" mechanism with the Admiralty and its political contacts, CPRE was able to persuade the Admiralty to choose another less contentious site. 87 The proposal, therefore, by the Ministry of Aircraft Production in 1940 to site a Short Sunderland flying boat production factory at Calgarth on the shores of Lake Windermere in the heart of the Lake District showed CPRE willing to test its relationship with the Government to the point of potential destruction. The site was to cover over five acres, employ up to 1,500 workers, 88 and buildings constructed would include a hangar that would be the largest single-span building in the country. 89 It was a fight that This was followed, four days later, by:
A Fine Fuss: Building Flying Boats in the Lake
if I were in the House of Commons I would not hesitate to say that the proposal is a thoroughly bad one from a national point of view…to put a factory of this kind on a lake like Windermere is sheer madness, as, owing to the very peculiar shape of the lake, the site can be so very easily identified from the air and I prophecy that it will be bombed unmercifully and probably from great heights because of the difficult flying conditions…it is probably the worst choice strategically that has yet been made…this one…is open to so much criticism from so many angles it is with extraordinary reluctance that we contemplate such a project…but it is essential for us to find a new site for a seaplane factory and conditions at Windermere seems to be so much more favourable than any we are likely to find elsewhere that our course seems to be imposed on us…we are concerned to provide the aircraft which will bring nearer the day of victory. Then peace and tranquillity will be restored to Lake Windermere and its temporary association with the aircraft industry will, happily, be at an end 96 The project went ahead. 98 Beaverbrook's inference that the factory and temporary workers' accommodation would be taken away at the end of the war was seized on by CPRE and became a major plank of its argument to ensure that the Calgarth site was returned to its original rural identity after the war. CPRE may have tested its political allegiance and reputation for "competent and reasonable representations" that it sought to establish with the Coalition Government, but there was a logic to its actions. In September 1945 CPRE stated that it and others saw In its determination to treat Calgarth as a red line issue CPRE had not seemingly been able to adhere to two of the operational tenets that it had established in the late 1930s: firstly, that if it was to oppose a Defence Department site proposal, then it needed to be able to suggest a viable alternative, and secondly, it needed to form allegiances with other influential and preferably national bodies, to avoid being isolated; once the National Trust had excluded itself from the campaign, it was not able to do this.
CPRE's efforts on Calgarth, all behind-the-scenes, show the shortcomings of Wilt's critique that CPRE was less active during the war than before it, as given the documentary evidence of CPRE's activity during the war, Wilt must have based his assessment on visible activity which in terms of public campaigns, questions and debates in Parliament, and media work, were inevitably curtailed or at least severely restricted during war-time.
Light at the End of the Tunnel: the Post-War Settlement
As noted earlier, CPRE was always extremely wary of requisitioned land not being restored to its pre-war use; it had calculated that the Government would have approximately 1,000 modern factories that had been built by the State to produce war-effort related materials -a significant number of which were in rural areas -to potentially turn over to the private sector authorise the acquisition of certain land used or dealt with for war purposes'. 102 CPRE did not feel the original bill provided for sufficient safeguards, as it allowed the Government to retain requisitioned land which had been damaged by war usage where reinstatement would be hazardous and costly, and as there was very little requisitioned land that had not been damaged or on which some buildings had not been erected, the Bill effectively allowed the Government to retain whatever land it wanted.
103
CPRE went public in January 1945 with its concerns through The Times, complaining that the Bill lacked the facility for sufficient parliamentary oversight over the actions of Ministers operating the proposed powers. 104 Abercrombie, newly knighted in the New Year Honours list, weighed in a few weeks later via the same mechanism, criticising the complete lack of reference to town and country planning, and raising the spectre of the 800,000 acres of agricultural land that had been requisitioned for non-farming use in war-time being sold off for non-agricultural use because it would fetch a higher price, thereby allowing industrial spread into rural areas. 105 A period of intense lobbying followed, with CPRE using its it was hardly to be foreseen that the CPRE's main preoccupation during the ensuing year would be, not the restoration of rural England after its merciful deliverance from the last war but the provision of extended training facilities in preparation for the next.
Yet so far this has proved to be the case.
113
The CPRE poacher had turned gamekeeper. Despite the advantages that influence brought, CPRE found itself an agent of the State, tasked with dealing with multiple voluntary organisation interests and agendas, some more capable of objectivity than others, rather like the different shades of opinion within CPRE itself. Perhaps ill-advisedly, but unintentionally entertainingly, CPRE complained about how difficult a job it had given itself:
it must be stated quite frankly that in trying to discharge this difficult task…the CPRE…(has)…not been helped by the inaccurate or tendentious form which public criticism has sometimes taken. It has for example, been alleged that the War Office, in given to agriculture; this observation was no great surprise, given CPRE's advocacy of agricultural development since its inception.
In one sense CPRE had had a "good war," despite the enormous changes that were imposed on the rural landscape as a result of a war-effort that enabled Britain to initially survive and then ultimately prevail. It achieved a degree of influence over both the choice of requisitioned sites for war-effort related purposes, and forced concessions from government with regard to the post-war de-requisitioning of land settlement. CPRE suffered defeats, such as the siting of the flying boat factory at Calgarth (although it would eventually get its wish that the site be more or less totally dismantled), and otherwise made representations to various Government departments vested with responsibility for prosecuting the war which may have been unwelcome, but it retained its standing because support for it was robust enough in political circles and the civil service to insulate it from falling out of favour at times when it was most oppositional. Crucially also, it was a conservation organisation concerned with protecting a cornerstone of the country's visual identity and culture, and could therefore be seen to be carrying out a patriotic function, at a time when the countryside was an emblematic cornerstone of the argument for resisting invasion and pursuing victory.
Further, the organisation stated explicitly that it supported the war effort, and -Calgarth notwithstanding -sought to pick its battles carefully. Hence, for example, it did not seek to 
